This article examines the Commission's preferences and preference formation in relation to the Convention and the negotiation of the Constitutional Treaty. Opposing approaches in the literature, which discuss Commission action in terms of the tendency of bureaucratic actors to seek to maximise power, status and opportunities, it argues that the Commission is better 1 We are indebted to the ten senior European Commission officials who kindly granted unattributable interviews on the topic addressed in this article. We should like to thank participants of workshops on
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-10 -became a fixed agenda item at the weekly meeting of the College. For the 1996 IGC, a Task Force was created to lead preparations and negotiations, which worked in liaison with the Commission President, the cabinet of Commissioner Oreja, responsible for institutional affairs, and consulted other cabinets, while a Steering Group, headed by Oreja, issued political orientations (Gray, 2002, 384) . In the run-up to Nice, however, there was a reversion to a more presidential style with Prodi taking personal charge, even though institutional affairs fell within Michel Barnier's remit.
14 Thus, the role taken by Commission Presidents, even the same individual, has not been invariant (Endo, 1999, 94) . Even though it is tempting to periodise preference formation since the 1985 IGC as presidential unilateralism (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) , followed by a spell of constrained presidentialism (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) , then a phase of collegiality (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) with a reversion to presidentialism in 2000, such a summary would not be entirely accurate (Dimitrakopoulos and Kassim 2005) .
A final consideration is that, although the process of preference formation is endogenous, it is important to remember that preferences emerge within a wider context in response to the requirements of a specific historical context and a particular stage of integration (Closa, 2002; 2004 -11 -the prevailing discussions and debates, and specific items on the reform agenda, a process that may take place during negotiations rather than in advance. They are likely to be revised as part of routine bargaining and may well be amended as in the approach to the endgame. -29 -project, the Commission found itself in a near-impossible position. On the one hand, its mission is to build Europe. This is the role given to it in the founding treaties. Its responsibility is to bring forward proposals to advance integration. On the other, when the negative results of the French and Dutch referenda were interpreted as a veto on the further development of the Union, it ran the risk that any intervention on its part would be condemned. The difficulty faced by the Commission is that, even though under the Presidency of Jose Manuel Barroso it has grasped that the debate about the future of Europe is essentially political, it is seen as part of the problem and is therefore discounted as a possible source of solutions to the Union's impasse.
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